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MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS
IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
AND THE UNITED STATES: A MOVEMENT
TOWARD A UNIFORM ENFORCEMENT BODY?
DAVID SNYDER*
I. INTRODUCTION
The extraterritorial application of competition laws is common in
the world market. The European Community (EC) and the United
States, which have the two largest international economies in the
world,1 often find themselves regulating the same mergers and other
financial transactions. This creates a potential for conflict, and the
resulting tension leads to efforts to harmonize EC and U.S. competi-
tion laws. While harmonization is itself important, it may not be
enough to ensure efficient regulation of the market. In addition to
considering the substance of the laws being applied to mergers, we
must also account for factors other than competition policy that
influence the decisions of regulatory bodies.
This Note will argue that the current system of extraterritorial
application of competition laws, while beneficial from a purely competi-
tive standpoint, is not optimally efficient for the world market. Because
nations consider industrial policy2 when investigating mergers, effi-
ciency losses can result. The recent merger between Boeing and
McDonnell Douglas3 reveals the tensions placed on enforcement bod-
ies in considering both industrial and competition policy. The Boeing
merger highlights the possible efficiency losses caused by the current
EC and U.S. systems of extraterritorial regulation of mergers. This
Note suggests a new system that will avoid these efficiency losses.
* B.A., Willamette University, 1995; J.D., Georgetown University Law Center, anticipated
1998.
1. See DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR AUDIOVISUAL, INFORMATION, COMMUNICATION AND CULTURE,
COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, EUROPE IN A CHANGING WORLD: THE ExTERNAL
RELATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNrrY 7 (1993).
2. Industrial policy is shorthand for any economic or social concern, other than competition
policy and efficiency, that influences antitrust law enforcement.
3. Boeing and McDonnell Douglas are the two major U.S. manufacturers of commercial
airplanes. In 1996, Boeing accounted for 64% of the production of aircraft world wide, while
McDonnell Douglas accounted for 3.3%. Their only major competitor was Airbus, which gained
32.3% of the world market. See Polly Lane, Boeing-Fired Up for '97-Company's First Priority Is to
ClearAntitrust Hurdle, SEATrLE TtIES,Jan. 12,1997, at Fl.
LAW & POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
Under the current system, national merger and acquisition authori-
ties have an incentive to advance industrial policy in an attempt to
increase national welfare relative to other countries.4 With the Clinton
administration's stance on government intervention, there are indica-
tions that industrial policy is a major consideration for the Department
of Justice (DOJ) and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) .5 The Euro-
pean Community similarly has an incentive to advance regional indus-
trial policy because of the political sensitivity of the EC Commission. 6
These incentives could lead both U.S. and EC enforcement authorities
to use merger control to protect and promote domestic industry.
Changing competition policy into a type of industrial policy, the
merger enforcement authorities no longer solely consider benefits to
the market; instead they concentrate also on benefiting their relative
economies.
This kind of misuse of national competition law has led to attempts
to create a worldwide antitrust code.7 While an international code is a
worthy goal, it is less important than creating uniform enforcement. As
the then-head of the Directorate TV for Competition Policy stated in
1993, "[w]hen we talk about convergence, it's probably more impor-
tant to talk about procedures [than substantive law] to make sure the
policies are the same .... "8
Some commentators believe the most effective way to ensure uni-
form policy is to create an international agency to handle antitrust
enforcement, perhaps through the World Trade Organization (WTO) .9
However, as was recognized by Ambassador to the EC Commission
4. See Chris Hewitt, Enhancing International Competitiveness: Structural Impediments to an Indus-
trial Policy for the United States, 25 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 257, 302 (1993). Hewitt argues that
antitrust policies should be relaxed to allow better competition with nations like Japan. See id. at
302-03.
5. See id. at 257.
6. See Peter Curwen, Merger Control in the European Community: An Analysis of Scope, Subsidiarity
and Duopoly, 5 Eu. Bus.J. *17 (1993), available in LEXIS, 4th News and Analysis. Curwen discusses
the approval of a merger between Aerospatiale's helicopter business and Merrerschmitt-B6
Bolkow-Blohm, which created a 50% market share in the EC for civilian helicopters. Approval of
this merger led the author to conclude that the "Commission's decisions in such cases are heavily
influenced by political considerations." Id.
7. One such antitrust code was proposed by the International Antitrust Code Working
Group. See International Antitrust Code Will Be Studied by GATT Members, 65 Antitrust & Trade Reg.
Rep. (BNA) No. 1628, at 259 (Aug. 19, 1993).
8. Conferees Address Harmonization of U.S., EC Competition Regimes, 65 Antitrust & Trade Reg.
Rep. (BNA) No. 1635, at 499 (Oct. 14, 1993).
9. See Commission Proposes WTO Led International Competition and Merger Rules; U.S. Ambassador
is Cautious, 8 EUROWATCH No. 18, Nov. 25, 1996.
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Greenwald, the creation of a world-wide antitrust body may be prema-
ture.10 Foremost among the problems with such a WTO body is that
substantial differences remain among the antitrust laws of WTO mem-
bers. In addition, there is significant disagreement and misunderstand-
ing about the goals of antitrust laws on a global scale. A global
enforcement body at this time seems unlikely; however, that should not
preclude smaller steps toward better international enforcement of
antitrust laws. One such step could be an EC/U.S. merger board to
regulate mergers that affect the interests of both jurisdictions.
This Note begins in Part II by comparing the standards under which
the United States and European Community apply their competition
laws extraterritorially to mergers and acquisitions. It will then briefly
compare the substance of those laws, noting ultimately that they are
very similar in their approach and could easily be applied by a joint
enforcement board. A consideration of the effects on the market of
industrial policy's influence on merger control is presented in Part III,
with the conclusion that the current system generally results in over-
regulation of mergers and acquisitions. As a result, the market is less
efficient, but retains higher levels of competition. Part V concludes by
proposing that a joint enforcement board for the European Commu-
nity and United States be implemented to alleviate these efficiency
losses.
II. EXTRATERRITORIALITY
A. U.S. Extraterritorial Application of Competition Laws
1. Extraterritorial Application by U.S. Courts
The United States applies competition laws to foreign undertakings
based on an "effects test." This standard was established by Judge
Learned Hand in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America." The test
allows antitrust laws to be applied extraterritorially if the acts in
question were (1) intended to have an effect on the United States and
(2) did have such an effect. 12 This very broad standard allows U.S.




11. 148F.2d416 (2d Cir. 1945).
12. See id. at 443-44.
13. See, e.g.,John A. Trenor, Comment,Jurisdiction and the Extraterritorial Application ofAntitrust
Laws After Hartford Fire, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1583, 1591 (1995).
1997]
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Perhaps in response to this criticism, the Ninth Circuit has tried to
limit the effects test. In Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America,14 the
Ninth Circuit set out the appropriate standard as a "Jurisdictional Rule
of Reason," 15 which requires a three part analysis: (1) does the activity
have or intend to have a substantial effect on U.S. commerce; (2) is the
activity of the magnitude to be covered by U.S. law; and (3) as a matter
of international comity, should the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the
court extend to cover the activity?16 The court must determine, under
the guise of comity, whether another jurisdiction's interest is so great
that as a matter of deference the court should refuse to apply jurisdic-
tion. 1 7 This test has met with mixed reaction. The Restatement of
Foreign Relations Law has adopted this standard, 18 but circuit and
district courts are divided over whether to consider issues of comity. 9
To date, the Supreme Court has not decisively ruled on the issue.
While the Supreme Court has not determined whether extraterrito-
rial application should be tempered with a standard of reasonableness,
it has considered the issue of extraterritorial application in Hartford Fire
Ins. Co. v. California.20 In Hartford, British insurance companies conspired
with one another to obtain favorable terms on premiums. Such collusion
violates U.S. antitrust laws. Because these companies operated in the United
States, nineteen different states joined to bring an antitrust action against
the British companies under both the Sherman and Clayton Acts. The
insurance companies responded by arguing that British law should control
based on ideas of comity, claiming extraterritorial application of U.S. law
would create a conflict between the two countries' laws.
The Supreme Court considered the issue and had the opportunity to
determine the limits of extraterritorial jurisdiction. However, instead of
determining whether to apply a reasonableness standard, the Court
focused solely on the conflict of laws issue, holding that comity is only
required when there is a true conflict between foreign and domestic
laws. 2' Because the British law in this case made the activities legal, but
14. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
15. Id. at 613-14.
16. See id. at615.
17. See id. at 614-15.
18. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 403 (1996).
19. Compare e.g., In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 617 E2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980) (favoring the
ALCOA test over the Timberlane test); with Rivendell Forest Prods., Ltd. v. Canadian Forest Prods., 810 F.
Supp. 1116 (D. Colo. 1993) (applying comity to refusejurisdiction over Canadian company).
20. 113 S. Ct. 2891 (1993) (refusingjurisdiction over Canadian lumber price fixing, despite
substantial effects).
21. Seeid. at 2910.
[Vol. 29
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS
did not require them, the Court reasoned that there was not a true
conflict. It concluded:
Since the London reinsurers do not argue that British law
requires them to act in some fashion prohibited by the law of
the United States ... or claim that their compliance with the
laws of both countries is otherwise impossible, we see no
conflict with British law .... We have no need in this case to
address other considerations that might inform a decision to
refrain from the exercise of jurisdiction on the grounds of
international comity.
22
As the Supreme Court defines it, a conflict will only exist when two
nations place conflicting obligations on a party and that party cannot
comply with both obligations.23 This kind of conflict will never arise in
the area of mergers and acquisitions. When a merger is investigated,
the government either approves or challenges it. Because a merger is
never required by law, a firm can always comply with the obligations of
both nations. Therefore, the holding of Hartford dictates that comity
will not play a role in the judicial analysis of mergers.
2. Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Law by the DOJ and the FTC
Although the courts may not require comity considerations when
evaluating proposed mergers and acquisitions, the agencies respon-
sible for enforcement do have some leeway in evaluating these factors.
Since the FrC and DOJ are primarily responsible for the enforcement
of U.S. antitrust laws, it is important to understand how they approach
the issue of comity.2 4 Using their broad prosecutorial discretion, the
agencies consider the important interests of foreign governments in
making decisions to oppose or approve international mergers.25
The DOJ issued guidelines for the enforcement of competition laws
22. Id. at 2910-11.
23. See id.
24. While private citizens do have the ability to bring a cause of action under the Clayton Act,
the vast majority of mergers and acquisitions are dealt with by the FTC or the DOJ. In addition,
once a merger is approved by those agencies, it is likely that a court will defer to theirjudgment. It
is only in the rare case of a merger not considered by the DOJ or the FTC that a private litigant has
a realistic chance of success. Otherwise any anticompetitive merger would have already been
opposed by one of the agencies, making an action by the private litigant unnecessary.
25. See Dept. ofJustice Antitrust Guidelines for Int'l Operations, 53 Fed. Reg. 21,584 (1988)
[hereinafter DOJ International Guidelines].
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in the international arena.26 These guidelines adopt the approach
taken by the Timberlane court.2 7 The DOJ applies U.S. law, based on the
effects doctrine, but tempers its enforcement by employing a reasonable-
ness, or comity, test.28 The DOJ has set out the relevant factors that
should be considered before applying the antitrust laws of the United
States extraterritorially.29 These factors are as follows:
(1) The relative significance, to the violation alleged, of con-
duct within the United States as compared to conduct abroad;
(2) The nationality of the persons involved or affected by the
conduct;
(3) The presence or absence of a purpose to affect U.S.
consumers or competitors;
(4) The relative significance and foreseeability of the effects of
the conduct on the U.S. as compared to the effects abroad;
(5) The existence of reasonable expectations that would be
furthered or defeated by the action; and
(6) The degree of conflict with foreign law or articulated foreign
economic policies.3°
This list reveals that the agencies are willing to consider important
issues of comity. Because there is no "conflict of laws" issue requiring
court considerations in the area of mergers and acquisitions, l the only
analysis of foreign comity interests will be done at the agency level.
B. , EC's Extraterritorial Application of Competition Laws
1. Application by the European Court ofJustice
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has adopted a very similar, if
not identical, approach to extraterritorial application of EC laws. It
applies a "modified effects test" as established in the Wood Pulp case.32
In Wood Pulp,3 3 a number of foreign firms, including eleven U.S.
companies, colluded to establish higher prices on wood pulp. The
26. Id.
27. See Timberlane Lumber, 549 E2d at 614-15.
28. See DOJ International Guidelines, supra note 25, at 21,595.
29. See id.
30. Id. (emphasis added).
31. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 113 S. Ct. 2891, 2910-11 (1993).
32. See Case 89/85, Ahlstr6hm v. Commission, 1988 E.C.R. 5194 (1988) (applying the Wood
Pulp test).
33. SeeCommission Decision 85/202/EEC, Re Wood Pulp, 3 C.M.L.R. 474,499 (1985).
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price fixing had a substantial effect on the EC, because nearly sixty
percent of all EC consumption of wood pulp was imported from the
firms.3 4 In its initial investigation, the Commission determined that EC
law should apply to these foreign firms. The Commission believed it
was appropriate to apply EC law based on the effects test, concluding
that "[i] n so far as the restrictive practices of the undertakings to which
this decision is addressed perceptibly affected competition within the
community and trade between the member states, Article (85) (1)
applies to them."
35
The parties in Wood Pulp challenged the decision of the Commission
to the European Court of Justice. 6 The parties contended that under
international and EC law, only territorial jurisdiction was permissible
and that this extraterritorial application was therefore improper. The
court dismissed the objection, ruling that the case did not require
extraterritorial jurisdiction and that territorial jurisdiction was being
applied.37 The court declared that the controlling factor was not where
the companies were located, but where they "implemented" their
illegal practices. "The decisive factor is therefore the place where [the
price fixing] is implemented."
3 8
While the court claimed to use territorial application, the "place of
implementation" test seems much like the effects test. The companies
in Wood Pulp were located outside of the European Community and
their illegal behavior (i.e., the act of collusion) did not occur within its
borders. The only implementation in the European Community by the
firms was to sell goods in the EC at artificially inflated prices. Whether
one deems this "implementation in" the European Community or
"effects on" the European Community is simply a matter of semantics.
If a company does not implement a practice in the European Commu-
nity, it is difficult to foresee it having any substantial effect. Similarly, if
an activity has a substantial effect in the European Community, some
illegal practice must necessarily be "implemented" there.
The U.S. firms also urged the ECJ to refuse jurisdiction on grounds
of comity, arguing that the United States had a more important interest
in this case and that its law should apply.3 9 The firms contended that
they were merely following the requirements of the Webb-Pomerene
34. SeeAhlstrbhm, 1988 E.C.R. at 5240.
35. Re Wood Pulp, 3 C.M.L.R. at 474.
36. SeeAhlstr6hm, 1988 E.C.R. at 5194.
37. See id. at 5243.
38. Id.
39. See id. at 5244.
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Act,4° which made such price-fixing activities legal in the United States.
The firms also claimed that EC law should not apply to them, as they
were merely conforming to U.S. law.41 The European Court of Justice
employed reasoning on this claim similar to that of the Supreme Court
in the Hartforad2 decision, holding that it need not consider issues of
comity in the case because there was no conflict between the laws of the
two jurisdictions.43 For comity to apply, there must be a "contradiction
between the conduct required by the United States and that required
by the Community." 44 If one can comply with both EC and U.S. law
there is no conflict, and thus no need to look at issues of comity. As in
the United States, the ECJ holding effectively eliminates comity in the
area of mergers and acquisitions, because a true conflict of laws will
never be present.
45
2. Extraterritorial Application by the Council and the Commission
Through the Merger Regulation 46 in 1989, the Council of the
European Union 47 codified the effects test for mergers. Application of
EC law to a merger requires only that a firm earn 250 million ECU in
the European Union and have 5 billion ECU turnover worldwide. 48 If,
in fact, the Wood Pulp implementation test was different from the effects
test, the Merger Regulation completely nullifies the prior standard.
There are no territorial requirements for jurisdiction. The Merger
Regulation bases its jurisdiction solely on the fact that very large
mergers will affect the EC market, which in turn will have a substantial
effect on the European Community. In this way, the Merger Regulation
buttresses the effects doctrine as the standard for extraterritorial
jurisdiction in the European Community.
The Merger Regulation is not only consistent with the effects test, but
also implicitly reaffirms that there is no requirement that a court
consider issues of comity. Nonetheless, there are indications that the
40. 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-66 (1994).
41. SeeAhlstr6hm, 1988 E.C.R. at 5244.
42. Hartford, 113 S. Ct. 2891.
43. See Ahlstr6hm, 1988 E.C.R. at 5244.
44. Id.
45. See text accompanying notes 21-24.
46. Council Regulation 4064/89 on the Control of Concentration Between Undertakings,
1989 OJ. (L 395) 1 [hereinafter Merger Regulation].
47. The Council is essentially the legislative branch of the European Union. It is composed of
the EU Ministers of every member state.
48. See Merger Regulation, supra note 46, art. 1.
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Commission will consider comity factors. The most obvious indication
given by the Commission is the Treaty on Competition made with the
United States.49 This treaty sets out that the European Community will
consider the important interests of the United States in enforcing its
own competition laws. While the treaty does not create any court-
enforceable comity requirement, it does reveal the Commission's will-
ingness to consider issues of comity in appropriate circumstances.
Having seen that the European Commission and United States apply
the same extraterritorial jurisdictional standard reveals the ease with
which a joint EC/U.S. merger board could determine its jurisdiction.
Other nations do not agree on the effects test, presenting a major
hurdle to global antitrust enforcement. Given that the United States
and European Community both apply an effects test, a joint board
could easily determine its jurisdiction based on such a uniform stan-
dard. All mergers with substantial effects in both the European Commu-
nity and United States would be reviewed by the joint board, while all
other mergers would be left to the individual enforcement bodies.
Because both the United States and the European Community recog-
nize the validity of the effects test, determining the board'sjurisdiction
should not be a stumbling block. Such ease in determining jurisdiction
would not be present with a global enforcement body.
III. U.S. AND EC SUBSTANTIVE MERGER LAws
Section 7 of the Clayton Act 5° is the primary U.S. legislation dealing
with mergers and acquisitions.5 1 This statute extends to partnerships,
sole proprietorships, and corporations.52 Not only does the Clayton Act
49. See Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the
Commission of the European Communities Regarding the Application of their Competition
Laws, 1995 O.J. (L 95) 1.
50. The Clayton Acts sets out in relevant part,
No person engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce shall acquire,
directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no
person subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the
whole or any part of the assets of another person engaged also in commerce or in any
activity affecting commerce, where in any line of commerce or in any activity affecting
commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be
substantially to lessen competition, or tend to create a monopoly.
15 U.S.C. § 18 (1994).
51. SeeWILLIAM C. HoLMEs, ANTITRUST LAW HANDBOOK 461 (1995).
52. See id. at 462.
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apply to mergers that would immediately have anticompetitive effects,
but it can also be applied to mergers that have a future probability of
substantially reducing competition.53
Once a merger is before either agency, that agency must make a
number of determinations. The agency begins by considering the
relevant product and geographical markets. 5 4 Then, it evaluates whether
the merger would significantly increase market concentration, result-
ing in potentially adverse competitive effects. 55 Next, the agency as-
sesses whether entry into the market would be timely in order to
counteract any anticompetitive effects. 56 Finally, the agency determines
any possible efficiency gains that could not reasonably be achieved in a
more competitive way.5 7 If, after considering these aspects, the agency
determines the merger is anticompetitive, the agency will either block
the merger or require that the parties take measures to solve the
problem. Most of the enforcement occurs through the use of a consent
decree requiring some kind of divestiture or competitive covenant
before the consolidation may take place.
The laws of the European Community are somewhat less clear than
the time-tested Clayton Act. When the EC was conceived, no law dealt
explicitly with mergers and acquisitions.58 Instead, the Court was
forced to expand the language of article 86, 59 and occasionally article
85, to cover mergers. As a response to this inadequate coverage of
mergers, the Council adopted the Merger Regulation. 61 The Merger
Regulation espouses a very similar approach to that taken in the United
States.
The Merger Regulation begins by requiring that notice be given to
the Commission of any merger falling within the scope of the regula-
tion. The Commission must define the relevant product and geo-
53. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962) (discussing the legislative intent
and the scope of the Clayton Act).




57. See id. at *64.
58. SeeTREATy ESTABLISHING THE EUiRoPEAN COMMUNrry Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. (C 224) (1) (1992),
[1992] (articles 85 and 86 deal most closely with mergers, but they do not give complete
coverage); see also Merger Regulation, supra note 46, Preamble ("Whereas Articles 85 and 86,
while applicable ... are not, however, sufficient to cover all operations which may prove to be
incompatible with the system of undistorted competition envisaged in the Treaty...").
59. See Case 6/72, Continental Can v. Commission, 1973 E.C.R. 215, 1973 C.M.L.R. 199.
60. See Case 156/84, BAT and Reynolds v. Commission, 1987 E.C.R. 4487, 1988 4 C.M.L.R. 24.
61. See Merger Regulation, supra note 46, Preamble.
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graphic markets. 62 After making those determinations, it turns to the
market structure and the impact the merger will have on competi-
tion.63 This generally takes the form of consideration of market shares
and market concentration. Then, the Commission considers a number
of other factors, including both barriers to entry and efficiencies
gained or lost from the merger. If the Commission rules that the
merger is anticompetitive, it most often enforces this decision through
some kind of settlement with the parties. The settlement usually
requires a divestiture or other competitive covenant.
A. Pre-Merger Notification Requirement
The first requirement placed on merging firms in the United States
is the notification requirement. 64 This requirement was added to the
original antitrust laws by the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improve-
ments Act of 1976.65 The filing requirement prevents firms from having
to "un-merge," by allowing either the FTC or DOJ to consider the
substance of the merger beforehand. Once the agencies have received
formal notice of the proposed merger, the parties must wait thirty days
62. See Henriette KB. Andersen, EC Merger Control Regulation as Applied in de Havilland Case, 7
N.Y. INT'L REV. 25, 30-32 (1994).
63. See id. at 32.
64. The filing requirements do not apply to all mergers. However, ifa merger is large enough
to invoke the jurisdictions of multiple nations, filing will most likely be necessary. Generally, a
filing is required if:
(1) The acquisition is of voting securities or assets, whether done directly or indirectly
through an entity such as a controlled partnership;
(2) The buyer or seller is engaged in interstate commerce or in an activity affecting
interstate commerce;
(3) The following "size of parties" test is met:
(a) One party has annual net sales or total assets of at least $100 million;
(b) The other party has annual net sales or total assets of at least $10 million;
and
(4) As a result of the acquisition, the buyer will hold assets and/or voting securities in
the seller satisfying either of the following "size of transaction" tests:
(a) At least 15 percent of either the seller's assets or its voting securities; or
(b) More than $15 million worth of the seller's assets and voting securities.
HoLMEs, supra note 51, at 465-66.
65. 15 U.S.C. § 18a (1994).
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66before completing the merger.66 This waiting period can be extended
for twenty additional days, plus any time needed to file supplemental
information.67 These time frames can be extended, but the intent is to
eliminate unnecessary delays.6s
Like the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976,69
the Merger Regulation requires notification of any merger as long as it
has a Community dimension.70 This requirement is crucial to EC
enforcement, because most enforcement occurs before the merger
takes place. While the notice provision eliminates the costs of "undo-
ing" a major merger, it also imposes delays on undertakings awaiting
approval. Like the United States, the European Community attempts to
alleviate this delay. Article 10 of the Merger Regulation places time
limits on the Commission, giving it one month after notification to
decide if it wishes to open proceedings against the firms.71 If it decides
to open formal proceedings, the Commission has four additional
months to conduct the investigation and to decide whether to block,
alter, or approve the merger.72 The whole system of advanced notifica-
tion is very similar to the U.S. system and sets the stage for preventive
enforcement of the Merger Regulation.
B. Definition of Relevant Product Market
In the United States, the DOJ defines the relevant product market by
concentrating primarily on demand-side substitution.73 The agency
considers the characteristics of the product to determine whether any
substitute goods are available to relevant consumers. Common goods
that are not unique will generally have a larger product market than
goods that are more unusual. If a market is defined broadly because of
readily available substitutes, a merger is more likely to be approved.
74
This is because the substitution effect ensures that there will be
competitive pricing even after the merger.
66. SeeHoLmES, supra note 51, at 465.
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. 15 U.S.C. § 18a (1994).
70. See Merger Regulation, supra note 46, art. 4. A merger is deemed to have a Community
dimension as long as one firm earns at least 250 million in the ECU and has five billion ECU
worldwide.
71. See id. art. 10.
72. See id.
73. See Merger Guidelines, supra note 54, at * 12. This approach has also been accepted by the
Supreme Court. SeeEastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Serv., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 481-82 (1992).
74. See Merger Guidelines, supra note 54, at *12.
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Similarly, in the European Community the Commission first defines
the relevant product market.75 The Commission defines the relevant
product market as comprised of, "in particular[,] all those products
which are regarded as interchangeable or substitutable by the con-
sumer, by reason of the products' characteristics, their prices and
intended use.",76 This approach is identical to the approach taken by
U.S. authorities. The determination hinges on demand-side substitut-
ability. If consumers can simply purchase a different product in re-
sponse to a price change, the product market will be defined broadly.
77
The broader the product market, the more likely it is that there will be
effective competition; therefore, the merger will more likely be ap-
proved.
C. Relevant Geographic Market
The geographic market of the product must also be determined. The
U.S. Supreme Court has set out the relevant factors that an agency
should use in defining the geographic market. The geographic market
is the "area in which the seller operates and to which buyers can
practicably turn for supplies."78 Courts and agencies will consider
practical considerations, such as the area in which the defendant
markets its product, the transportation costs of the product, and the
perishability of the product.79 If transportation costs are low and the
product is not perishable, the geographic market will often be large,
simply because firms from farther away are able to compete in the
region.
In the European Community, many people believed that the Commis-
sion would adopt a presumption of a Community-wide geographic
market.80 Instead, the Commission considers many issues in defining
the geographic market. As in the United States, the major consider-
75. SeeAndersen, supra note 62, at 30.
76. See Commission Decision of 2 October 1991 Declaring the Incompatibility with the
Common Market of a Concentration Case IV/M.053, Aerospatiale-Alenia/de Havilland, 1991 O.J.
(L 334) 1, 10 [hereinafter de Havilland Decision]. Looking at the issue of substitutability, the
Commission determined that largerjet aircraft were not substitutable for commuter aircraft and
therefore defined the relevant product market as regional (commuter) aircraft. See id. 1 8.
77. See Merger Regulation, supra note 46, at *12.
78. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 359 (1963) (quoting Tampa Elec.
Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 327 (1961)); see also T. Harris Young & Assoc., Inc. v.
Marquette Elec., Inc., 931 F.2d 816, 823 (11th Cir. 1991) ("The geographic dimension is the area
in which the product or its reasonably interchangeable substitutes are traded.").
79. SeeHoLMEs, supra note 51, at 315.
80. SeeAndersen, supra note 62, at 32.
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ations are the costs of transportation and barriers to the importation of
substitute items.8' If transportation costs are relatively low and barriers
minimal, the geographic area of competition becomes larger. This is
because, with low transportation costs, a firm in the United States or
elsewhere may be able to compete in the European Community against
native firms. On the other hand, if a product is relatively expensive to
transport, then it is unlikely that a firm outside of the Community will
be able to compete with domestic companies, dictating a smaller
geographic market.
82
D. Market Share and Market Concentration
Considerations of market share and the importance of market
concentration are the areas in which the EC and U.S. approaches differ
most. U.S. agencies consider both market share and concentration. If
market share and market concentration are high, the merger is pre-
sumed to be invalid.83 The Supreme Court has held that a merger by a
firm that acquired only one percent more market share, but already
had twenty-eight percent of the market in a very concentrated industry,
was invalid.84 The Court explained that "even a slight increase in
concentration" will make the merger illegal when concentration is
already great in the industry.85
The FIFC and DOJ both use these basic tests in their merger guide-
lines. They focus on the market share and concentration, indicating
that high concentration will generally create a presumption of invalid-
ity.8 6 Agencies calculate market concentration by using the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI), which is a measure of market competition.
The HHI is defined as the sum of the squares of the post-merger
market share percentage of all competitors in a given market.8 7 If the
81. See STEPHEN WEATHERILL & PAUL BEAUMONT, EC LAw: THE ESSENTIAL GUIDE TO THE LEGAL
WORINGS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 823-24 (1995).
82. Compare de Havilland Decision, 1991 O.J. (L 334) 20 (finding a world market where
"there are not tangible barriers to the importation of these aircraft into the Community and there
are negligible costs of transportation"); wuith Case IV/M.190, Nesth6/Perrier v. Commission, 1992
O.J. (L 356) 21,25, [1993] 4 C.M.L.R. 17 (price of water is low, but transportation costs are
high, so the relevant geographic market is only France) [hereinafter Nestd6/Perrier].
83. FTC v. University Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1218 (1 1th Cir. 1991).
84. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271 (1964).
85. Id. at 279.
86. See Merger Guidelines, supra note 54, at *40 ("Other things being equal, market
concentration affects the likelihood that one firm, or a small group of firms, could successfully
exercise market power.").
87. For example, if a market has one firm with a 30% market share, one with 25%, one with
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HHI is below 1000, the merger will most likely not have anticompetitive
effects.88 If it is between 1000 and 1800, the merger will probably not be
challenged, as long as the change in concentration is less than 100
points, meaning that the firm did not increase its market share enough
to make the merger anticompetitive.8 9 If the HHI is above 1800 and the
change in market concentration is more than 50, it is likely that the
merger will be challenged.90
The European Comnunity takes a slightly different approach. Ar-
ticle 2 of the Merger Regulation provides the framework under which
the effects of a merger are to be considered. The regulation provides
that when a concentration creates or strengthens a dominant position
that further hampers effective competition, the merger is not to be
approved.91 In making this decision the Commission must take into
account:
the need to preserve and develop effective competition within
the common market in view of, among other things, the struc-
ture of all the markets concerned and the actual or potential
competition from undertakings whether located within or with-
out the Community.
92
Under this provision, the Commission will look to the change in
market share and market structure. The higher the market share, the
less likely the Commission is to approve the merger because of the
danger of a dominant position.93
While this is similar to the U.S. approach, there is one major
difference. The European Community does not consider high market
concentration as a major factor against allowing a merger. Rather, the
Commission focuses on the formation of a dominant position and
considers whether the remaining competitors are strong enough to
compete with the new entity. Under this approach, the Commission is
likely to allow a merger that leaves only three firms in the industry, as
long as their market shares are fairly equal. The same highly concen-
20%, one with 15% and one with 10%, the HHI = 2250 (302 + 252 + 202 + 152 + 102). This would
be considered a concentrated industry.
88. SeeHoLMES, supra note 51, at 485.
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. See Merger Regulation, supra note 46, art. 2.
92. Id.
93. See de Havilland Decision, 1991 OJ. (L 334) 1 28 (opposing the merger when market
share grew from 46% to 63%, because this strengthened a dominant position).
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trated industry is presumed to be an anticompetitive oligopoly in the
United States. However, under the language of the Merger Regulation,
this does not create an anticompetitive "dominant position" in the
European Community.
Despite the fact that the language of the Merger Regulation largely
ignores oligopolies, the Commission has applied the Merger Regula-
tion to those arrangements.94 In the Nesd /Perrier 9 5 merger, and
again in the Mannesmann/Vallourec/Ilva 9 merger, the Commission
applied the regulation to oligopolies and substantially altered those
consolidations. The Commission applied the regulation to those cases
despite the fact that the merger created a duopoly or oligopoly instead
of one dominant firm.9 7 This result shows that the practical approaches
of the United States and European Community are not so different,
despite the contrast in technical language. Both the United States and
the European Community will consider market shares and market
concentration, even though concentration ratio is not firmly imbedded
in the analysis of the Merger Regulation.
E. Entry Analysis
Notwithstanding the fact that a high market concentration indicates
that a merger is anticompetitive under U.S. law,98 a party can rebut this
presumption by a showing of other factors. One of the most important
factors that the FTC and DOJ will consider is the entry of potential
competitors into the market.99 If significant entry into the industry is
possible, then this may temper the anticompetitive effects of the
merger.100 The agency will not challenge a merger if entry into the
market is so easy that market participants, either collectively or unilater-
ally, could not profitably maintain, an artificial price increase above
pre-merger levels. 10'
The European Community takes a similar approach to barriers to
94. See generally EleanorJ. Morgan, The Treatment of Oligopoly Under the European Merger Control
Regulation, 41 ANTrrRUST BULL.. (Mar. 22, 1996) (dealing with the Commission's handling of
oligopolies, but concluding that the Commission is moving toward looking at concentration data
to determine competition).
95. Nestl/Perrier, 1992 O.J. (L 356) 1.
96. Case IV/M.315, Mannesmann/Vallourec/Ilva, 1994 O.J. (L 102) 15.
97. SeeWEATHERIL & BEAUMONT, supra note 81, at 825.
98. See FTC v. University Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1218 (11th Cir. 1991) (findings of high
market share and high concentration create a presumption of illegality).





entry. Upon a finding that a merger would create a dominant market
position, the Commission must still consider the possibility that other
firms will enter the market and create additional competitive pres-
sure.10 2 If market entry is not burdensome, then "the dominant
position is not likely to significantly impede effective competition"
within the meaning of the Merger Regulation. 10 3 The reasoning,
similar to that advanced in the United States, is that if a dominant firm
tries to manipulate prices and create monopoly profits, other firms will
enter the market and reduce prices to competitive levels. Applying this
reasoning, both the United States and European Community will
approve mergers that create dominant firms, so long as the possibility
for competition will keep them from exerting pressure on prices and
gaining monopolistic profits.
F. Efficiency Analysis
The DOJ and FTC will both consider efficiency gains in determining
whether a proposed merger will be beneficial to consumers. As the
agencies point out, "[t] he primary benefit of mergers to the economy
is their efficiency-enhancing potential, which can increase the competi-
tiveness of firms and result in lower prices to consumers., 10 4 The
agencies have determined that a merger may be approved, despite
having the potential for anticompetitive effects, if the expected net
efficiencies are significantly greater than the competitive risks.10 5 While
the Supreme Court has never forwarded efficiency gains as a reason to
approve a merger, recent circuit court cases have considered the
efficiency-enhancing potential. For example, the Eleventh Circuit has
recognized that efficiency gains should be analyzed in considering a
merger, so long as the benefits flow to the consumer.10 6 Thus, although
efficiency analysis has not been specifically adopted by the Supreme
Court, it is applied in the lower courts and through the prosecutorial
discretion of the agencies.
107
102. See Merger Regulation, supra note 46, art. 2.
103. Seede Havilland Decision, 1991 O.J. (L 334) at 53.
104. Merger Guidelines, supra note 54, at *64.
105. See id. at *65.
106. See FrC v. University Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206,1222 (11 th Cir. 1991).
107. See Mark A. Warner, Efficiencies and Merger Review in Canada, the European Community, and
the United States: Implications for Convergence and Harmonization, 26 VAND.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1059, 1106
(1994). In addition to arguing that the United States should do more to consider efficiency gains
and losses from mergers, the author also does an excellent job of explaining the economic
significance of productive and allocative efficiencies. See id. at 1061-68.
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The Commission also will consider the issue of efficiency gains in
contemplating a proposed merger. Even though it has never used
efficiency gains to uphold a merger,10 8 the issue of efficiencies has been
raised in cases before the Commission. In the recent merger of Accor
and Wagons-Lits, 10 9 the Commission considered that the merger, while
creating a dominant position, could nonetheless be beneficial to
consumers if net efficiency gains were created. The firms had argued
that the merger would result in productive efficiencies from economies
of scale and that these benefits outweighed the losses in allocative
efficiencies to the consumers. The Commission ultimately rejected this
argument, claiming that even if it were true, those same efficiencies
could be accomplished by other means that were less detrimental to
competition.110 The Commission stated that the benefits in this case
were speculative and would not pass down to the consumer.11 Even
though the Commission ruled against the efficiency argument in this
case, the ruling is strong evidence that the Commission might uphold a
merger that resulted in net efficiency gains, so long as the benefits
accrued to consumers.
G. Enforcement Activities
In order to enforce their decisions, the FIFC and DOJ require the
assistance of the courts. Once an agency has concluded that a merger is
anticompetitive, it may seek court remedies, including forced divesti-
ture of stock or assets, corporate spin-offs, or various restrictions on the
companies' production or competition.11 2 While this kind of retroac-
tive relief from the courts is available, the most common form of
enforcement is through a consent decree.1
3
A consent decree places conditions on a merger in exchange for the
agency's approval. Most consent decrees require divestiture of some of
the merging company's assets.' 1 4 An example of such a decree oc-
curred recently in the merger of Kimberly-Clark Corporation and Scott
Paper Company. Because of high concentration and market share, the
DOJ required the two companies to divest production facilities for baby
108. See id. at 1095.
109. See id. at 1097 (explaining the case and application by the EC of efficiency analysis).
110. See id.
111. See id.
112. See HOLMEs, supra note 51, at 315.
113. See Helmut Bergmann, Settlements -in EC Merger Control Proceedings: A Summary of EC
Enforcement Practice and a Comparison with the United States, 62 ANrrrRusr L.J. 47, 47 (1993).
114. See id. at 60.
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wipes and facial tissue products.1 15 Not only did these assets have to be
divested, but they also had to be preserved in production form, so that
a prospective purchaser could immediately compete in the industry.
11 6
This kind of divestiture is the most common requirement used by the
DOJ and FTC in consent decrees to retain competition allowing for
approval of the merger. 17
There are other restrictions that the agencies may place on a merger.
Often, the DOJ or FTC will require leasing or licensing of key assets,
important patents or technology and the conclusion of supply agree-
ments for the newly acquiring company of the divested assets. 118 These
types of competitive covenants are quite common, alone or in conjunc-
tion with a divestiture. 1 9 While these requirements are admittedly not
enforceable without court approval, most settlements are approved
with little complication, leaving primary enforcement authority of such
antitrust laws to the DOJ and FTC.
In the European Community, the Commission has the power to call a
concentration incompatible with the common market.120 After deem-
ing a concentration incompatible, the Commission has a number of
remedies available. If the merger has already taken place, the Commis-
sion may require the "undertakings or assets.., to be separated or the
cessation ofjoint control or any other action that may be appropriate to
restore conditions of effective competition. ' 121 This is a very broad
range of retroactive powers. However, the Commission's most impor-
tant power is the ability to alter proposed mergers through consent
decrees,just as in the United States.
Article 8(2) gives the Commission the power to "attach to its
decision conditions and obligations ... with a view to modifying the
original concentration plan.' ' 122 This is the most widely used method of
enforcement and results in settlement negotiations that begin almost
as soon as a firm proposes its merger to the Commission.123 Most often,
the European Commission requires partial divestiture of assets, but it
115. United States and Texas v. Kimberly-Clark Corp. and Scott Paper Co.; Proposed Final
Judgment and Competitive Impact Statement, 60 Fed. Reg. 66,557 (1995) (proposed Dec. 22, 1995).
116. See id. at 66,561.
117. See, e.g., United States v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 60 Fed. Reg. at 66,557.
118. SeeBergmann, supra note 113, at 67.
119. See id.
120. See Merger Regulation, supra note 46, art. 8 (3).
121. Id. art. 8(4).
122. Id. art. 8(2).
123. SeeBergmann, supra note 113, at 51 (noting that some cases are settled even before the
second phase of investigation is opened).
1997]
LAW & POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
may also use less restrictive approaches.' 24 Such solutions may include
ensuring the independence of competitors, granting leases or licensing
of intellectual property to competitors, and restricting future behavior,
such as through covenants not to compete or not to acquire certain
assets.
125
The Kimberly-Clark/Scott Paper' 26 merger also reveals how the
European Community has used consent decrees to modify mergers. In
that case, the Commission approved the merger subject to compliance
with a number of obligations. 1 7 The Commission required that Kim-
berly-Clark divest its kitchen towel business in the United Kingdom and
in the Republic of Ireland. This included granting the purchaser a
three-year, royalty-free use of the trademark name "Kleenex," with
seven years of optional renewals of the license with royalty payments. 128
In addition, Kimberly-Clark was required to divest production facilities
in the United Kingdom, 129 accounting for 12.3% of production in the
U.K. and Irish markets.130 That divestiture included the transfer of
sales, production, and administrative staff, and the assignment of
existing contracts for inputs.1 3 1 By requiring these changes, the Com-
mission preserved the competitive atmosphere of all sectors of the
paper products market.
Unlike the DOJ and the FTC, the EC Commission has the power to
enforce its own decisions. 132 This power is subject to unlimited review
by the ECJ. 133 While it seems the Commission has greater enforcement
power, in practice both the U.S. and EC authorities have similar
degrees of power. Both rely on negotiated consent decrees and both
can turn to a court to validate their decisions if a party objects.
H. Comparative Summary of EC and U.S. Substantive Competition Law
The substance of both U.S. and EC merger laws is very similar. The
124. See id. at 89.
125. See id.
126. Commission Decision of Jan. 1996 Relating to a Proceeding Pursuant to Council
Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89 (declaring a concentration to be incompatible with the common
market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement Case IV/M.623, Kimberly-Clark/Scott, 1996
O.J. (L 183) 1).
127. See id. at 39.
128. See id. at 33-34.
129. See id. at 38.
130. See id.
131. See id. at 35.
132. See Merger Regulation, supra note 46, arts. 8, 14, 15.
133. See id. art. 16.
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process begins with notification followed by a determination of the
relevant product and geographic markets, concentrating mostly on the
idea of substitutability. Then both jurisdictions consider market share.
The only major difference in enforcement is that a high market
concentration in the industry does not traditionally create a presump-
tion of illegality in the European Community. However, the Commis-
sion has now indicated its willingness to implicitly consider market
concentration by applying the Merger Regulation to oligopolies. Both
jurisdictions conclude their analysis by considering whether barriers to
entry or efficiency gains can save an otherwise anticompetitive merger.
Not only is the substance of the laws very similar, but also the manner
of enforcement in both jurisdictions is analogous. Both enforcement
authorities have the power to attack a merger that has already taken
place, and, more importantly, they can block or alter proposed merg-
ers. In both jurisdictions, consent decrees are most often used to alter
the merger, generally through divestiture orders. While the Commis-
sion may enforce its own decisions, in practice such authority does not
represent a large deviation from U.S. enforcement. Because most cases
are handled through consent decrees, U.S. courts are usually only
consulted to approve predetermined settlements. This leaves most
practical enforcement authority with the agencies,just as the Commis-
sion has primary authority in the European Community.
As was the case with extraterritorial jurisdiction, the substantive
standards for merger regulation in the European Community and
United States are very similar. Although global antitrust substantive
standards may be a bar to the creation of a global enforcement body,
EC and U.S. substantive standards do not impede the creation of ajoint
enforcement board. Such a board could simply apply the current laws
as applied in both the European Community and United States to all
appropriate mergers.
IV. INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND INCONSISTENT APPLICATION OF
COMPETITION LAWS
Both the European Community and the United States would benefit
from a joint enforcement board. It is necessary for the United States
and the European Community to create a merger board because
current enforcement authorities take improper considerations into
account when applying the law. Foremost among these considerations
is industrial policy. By considering industrial policy when investigating
mergers and acquisitions, national authorities grant domestic compa-
nies competitive advantages. If a merger will help a domestic industry,
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even if it is not competitively sound, an enfor cement body might
approve it. The enforcement authority would do so because even
though overall market welfare will decrease, domestic welfare may
improve relative to the rest of the world. Both EC and U.S. authorities
have an incentive to advance these industrial policy concerns. The
Commission is subject to considerable political pressures from member
states in making its decisions. 134 Even though industrial policy and
other social factors are not to be considered under the Merger Regula-
tion,135 it is impossible for the Commission to remain completely
isolated from all political pressure. l 6 In a similar way, the FTC and the
DOJ are both politically influenced and thus use national industrial
policy as a factor in their decisions.13 7 The Attorney General and the
FTC Commissioners are appointed officials. Thus, the authorities
applying the law may be influenced by issues of national policy. If, in
fact, these considerations are included, regulation of mergers and
acquisitions is not as efficient as it should be.
In many cases, where the relevant product and geographical markets
are small, political influences may not have a great effect on merger
policy. In those cases, one party can regulate the effects that a merger
will have on its own markets without effecting the other party. With no
overlap in jurisdiction, there will be little or no conflict in application
of the laws. This situation was present in the Kimberly-Clark/Scott
Paper merger. In that case, the merger as proposed created a number
of anticompetitive effects in both the European Community and the
United States. The United States dealt with the relevant U.S. effects and
required divestiture of some U.S. assets. 1 3 8 However, it did not examine
any of the effects that would take place in Europe. Instead, the
European Community opened its own investigation and required
divestiture of European assets.189 Although this was technically extrater-
ritorial application, it had little impact on the United States.
134. See Curwen, supra note 6, at 17-23 (when considering major mergers "the obvious
lesson to be learned from this apparent inconsistency is that the Commission's decisions in such
cases are heavily influenced by political considerations").
135. SeeWATHEmRILL & BEAUMONT, supra note 81, at 827.
136. Many people called for more industrial policy considerations and sought to promote
the industrial interest of the EC after the decision in the de Havilland Decision. Whether or not
the Commission will completely defer to industrial policy is yet to be determined. See id.
137. SeeLane, supra note 3, at Fl.
138. United States and Texas v. Kimberly-Clark Corp. and Scott Paper Co.; Proposed Final
Judgment and Competitive Impact Statement, 60 Fed. Reg. 66,557 (1995) (proposed Dec. 22,1995).
139. Commission Decision of Jan. 1996 Relating to a Proceeding Pursuant to Council
Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89 (declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common
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However, there are a large number of cases in which the relevant
market is global. In those cases, any decision by one party to block or
alter a merger will have a direct effect on the policies of the other party.
This kind of situation was found in the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas
merger. 40 Because the Boeing merger implicated a completely inte-
grated world market for aircraft, decisions by either party greatly affect
the other. Ideally, the basis of these decisions should be competition
policy alone, but considerations of industrial policy are likely to be
contemplated in an effort to improve national welfare.
A. U.S. Incentives to Allow the Boeing Merger
There is an incentive for the United States to approve the Boeing
merger, even if it has substantial anticompetitive effects. The incentive
stems from the ability to externalize the costs of the anticompetitive
merger onto other nations, while internalizing many of the benefits.
Normally, if all costs and benefits are considered, the DOJ or FTC
would reject an anticompetitive merger if the merger would result in
allocative inefficiencies that create losses for consumers.14 ' However, if
most of the losses can be externalized onto consumers in other
countries, while most of the gains can be internalized in the United
States, then the merger might be approved in order to accomplish
national welfare gains.
1 42
The Boeing/McDonnell Douglas merger presents such an opportu-
nity to externalize costs. The merger creates a massive company with
market shares of more than sixty percent. 143 If the United States
approves the merger despite its anticompetitive effects, a dominant
domestic company would be created. This could result in allocative
inefficiencies worldwide and some productive efficiencies. Assuming
that the productive efficiency gains do not outweigh the allocative
efficiency losses, the merger is not good for the world market.
market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement Case IV/M.623, Kimberly-Clark/Scott, 1996
O.J. (L 183) 1).
140. Boeing and McDonnell Douglas are two of the largest aircraft manufacturers in the
world. They both have notified the EC and the U.S. of their plans to merge and both sides were
investigating the competitive effects this merger might have. See Shailagh Murray, Boeing DealFaces
HeadwindfromEUas CommercialAirline Sales Stir Worry, WAL ST.J., Dec. 19, 1996, at A10.
141. See Harry First, Structural Antitrust Rules and International Competition: The Case ofDistressed
Industries, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1054, 1066-67 (1987).
142. See Hewitt, supra note 4, at 258-62.
143. See Doug Abrahms, EUPlans Probe of U.S. Plane Merger, WAsH. TimEsJan. 23, 1997, at B7.
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However, some of the benefits from the merger will fall only within
the United States. These benefits include increased tax revenues
generated as Boeing earns increased profits from its dominant world-
wide position. There will also be increased employment in the United
States as Boeing hires -more workers to meet the increased demand for
its planes. While such factors are not meant to be considered under
competition policy, it is likely, and often urged, that they be consid-
ered.1"4 This changes the balance that the United States uses in
applying its antitrust laws. The agencies will now pass the merger so
long as its allocative inefficiencies to U.S. consumers are outweighed by
the productive efficiencies and the national welfare gains from having a
dominant industry. The effect of this is under-enforcement of U.S.
competition laws, because the government is approving an anticompeti-
tive merger that provides gains for the United States relative to the rest
of the world.
To demonstrate, one can attribute utility values to the Boeing
merger. Suppose considerations of industrial policy from the merger
would create 100 units of gain to the United States through such
benefits as increased employment1 45 and tax revenues. Next, suppose
that worldwide there would be a loss of 150 units due to anticompetitive
effects, but that only 75 of these units would burden U.S. consumers.
146
Further assume that there are significant worldwide production effi-
ciency gains of 75 units, 40 units of which benefit the U.S. economy.
147
Applying normal competition policy, the United States should block
this merger, because the allocative efficiency losses outweigh the produc-
tive efficiency gains.148 However, if the United States examined this
from an industrial policy standpoint, there is only a 75-unit allocative
loss to U.S. consumers, while there is 40-unit gain from productive
efficiencies and a 100-unit gain from industrial policy considerations.
144. See Hewitt, supra note 4, at 302 (arguing that the United Sates should loosen antitrust
laws in order to remain competitive globally).
145. This would presumably be employment that is gained from competitors like Airbus;
therefore, employment in the industry worldwide is not increasing, but in the United States it is.
146. Half of the costs would fall on the United States if U.S. consumers were responsible for
the purchase of one half of the world's airplanes. In reality, the percentage of costs falling on the
United States would be smaller, because all of the other nations of the world probably buy more
than 50% of Boeing's planes.
147. Productive efficiency gains would be distributed based roughly on sales of planes,
because most of the benefit of a merger is from economies of scale. The economies of scale allow
per unit prices for airplane production to be reduced. It is assumed, then, that the lower prices for
planes would pass on to the consumers.
148. 75 gain - 150 allocative loss = -50 net loss from merger.
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In this case there is a net 65-unit gain 1 49 to the United States. Under
this balance, U.S. regulators will approve the merger in order to
improve the national welfare.
This approach creates a situation in which the United States ap-
proves a merger that is not beneficial to the world market. Because the
consumers of products such as airplanes are worldwide consumers and
the benefits from the merger mostly extend to the producing nation,
the United States would benefit by approving the merger. Of course, if
jet aircraft were purely domestic products, this approach would not
work, because all costs and benefits would be incurred in the United
States and the costs could not be externalized. Industrial policy can
only be advanced when the relevant market is international. Neverthe-
less, with the increasing globalization of the economy, the ability to
externalize costs will increase.
B. European Community Incentives to Apply Their Competition Law
The merger of U.S.-based firms like Boeing and McDonnell Douglas
will also create incentives for EC opposition. As we have seen, the
Commission is justified in investigating this merger under the effects
test because it falls within the turnover requirements of the Merger
Regulation. 150 The only limiting consideration may be the idea of
comity. Considerations of comity, however, did not stop the European
Community from scrutinizing the Boeing merger. When applying its
own law there is great incentive for the European Community to block
the merger, even if it is good for the global economy. The Commission
has the incentive to promote the aerospace industry in the European
Community by protecting Airbus, a European competitor. 51 Through
blocking the merger, the Commission could protect Airbus' competi-
tive position. The European Community would keep the jobs that the
United States would have gained through the merger and EC member
states would retain the tax revenue from Airbus' operations.
Again, by assigning values to the utility of this merger, the incentive
for the European Community to advance its welfare through competi-
tion policy is revealed. Suppose the Boeing merger has little or no
149. -75 U.S. allocative efficiencies + 100 national welfare gains + 40 national productive
gains = +65 net gain to United States from merger.
150. EU 'more than likely' to Probe Boeing/McDonnell Douglas Merger, 180 AEROSPACE DAILY 420,
Dec. 19, 1996.
151. Airbus is a four member consortium that is the second leading producer of airplanes. See
Charles Goldsmith, Airbus Prepares for Unique Restructuring: Four Members Need to Mesh Assets and
Cultures, WALL ST.J., Aug. 30, 1996, atA6.
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allocative efficiency losses,' meaning that the merger is competitively
sound. At the same time the merger results in twenty-five units of
productive efficiency gains for the world market, ten units of which
benefit EC consumers. However, the merger hurts the competitive
stance of Airbus, so costs to the European Community in employment
and other losses from Airbus' deteriorated position are equal to fifty
units. Looking at this merger from a purely competitive standpoint, EC
authorities should approve the merger because it results in twenty-five
units of benefit to the world market. However, if the Commission
considers EC welfare, as many parties advocated after the de Havilland
decision, 152 it would block the merger. The merger results in losses to
the European Community of fifty units and gains of only ten. From a
purely EC industrial welfare perspective, this merger should not be
approved.
Although the Commission and the FTC both claim not to congider
industrial policy in applying antitrust laws, one need only look to the
actual outcome of the Boeing merger to realize national considerations
do play a role. While we have already seen that the United States and
European Community apply very similar substantive laws to mergers,
the two enforcement authorities treated the merger very differently.
The FTC found no violation of the antitrust laws caused by the merger
and did not challenge it.1 53 The FTC based its decision on the fact that
McDonnell Douglas "no longer constitutes a meaningful competitive
force."
154
The European Community scrutinized the merger more closely and
threatened to block it until the Commission completed last-minute
negotiations with Boeing. 155 After Boeing's concessions, the Commis-
sion approved the merger subject to conditions. 156 Boeing's conces-
sions consisted of:
the cessation of existing and future supply deals, the "ring-
fencing" of McDonnell Douglas's commercial aircraft activities,
152. SeeAndersen, supra note 62, at 40-41; see aso EATHERILL & BEAUMONT, supra note 81, at
827 ("the Commission was also criticized for failure to take account of the industrial and regional
implications of the [de Havilland merger].").
153. See FTC Won't Ground Consolidation of Boeing & McDonnell Douglas, 73 Antitrust & Trade
Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1818, at 4 (July 3, 1997).
154. Id.
155. Merger Control: Boeing Merger Approval Points Up Lessons For.Regulators and Industry, Eus.
REP., No. 2244,July 26, 1997.
156. See Commission of the European Communities, Press Release 97/729 of 30 July 1997,
The Commission Clears the Merger Between Boeing and McDonnell Douglas Under Conditions and
Obligations, available in LEXIS, ECNews Library, RAPID File.
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the licensing of patents to other jet aircraft manufacturers, and
commitments not to abuse relationships with customers and
suppliers and a commitment to report annually to the Commis-
sion on military and civil aeronautics R&D projects benefiting
from public funding. 157
The Commission had considered requiring Boeing to divest McDon-
nell Douglas's Civil Aircraft sector, but abandoned the idea when it was
determined that there was no legitimate buyer.158 Instead, Boeing was
required to maintain the Civil Aircraft section as a separate legal entity
for a period of ten years.
15 9
If, in fact, the two sides did not consider industrial policy in applying
the same substantive standards to this merger, how could such different
results have been reached? Even though both parties claim they did not
consider industrial policy, 160 this Note would argue that both jurisdic-
tions considered such policy concerns and thus arrived at such differ-
ent conclusions.
1. Agreement Between the U.S. and the EC on Application of Their
Competition Laws as an Answer to the Inconsistency
In order to alleviate these kinds of conflicts, the' United States and
the European Community have entered into an agreement on the
application of their competition laws. 61 The treaty recognizes in its
preamble that "sound and effective enforcement of the Parties' compe-
tition laws would be enhanced by cooperation." 162 To implement this
goal of effective enforcement, the treaty creates a number of notifica-
tion and information-sharing requirements.1 63 While these require-
ments make both parties aware of the other's interest and makes
information gathering easier, they do little to assure that the laws are




160. For example, the four commissioners' statement for the FTC emphasized that the
agency did not clear the transaction to create a "national champion" in the commercial aircraft
industry. See WEATHERILL & BEAUMONT, supra note 81, at 827.
161. See Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the
Commission of the European Communities Regarding the Application of their Competition
Laws, supra note 49.
162. Id. at Preamble.
163. See id. arts. 2,3.
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Article V sets out provisions that are designed to avoid conflicts in the
application of competition laws. It allows one party to request that
enforcement activities be carried out in the other party's territory.
164
However, actual enforcement is discretionary and does not preclude
enforcement by both parties against a single undertaking. The treaty
explicitly states that nothing in the article "precludes the notifying
party from undertaking enforcement activities with respect to such
anticompetitive activities.", 16 5 The treaty attempts to temper any pos-
sible conflicts in application by requiring that "each party will seek at
all stages in its enforcement activities, to take into account the impor-
tant interests of the other party."' 166 This essentially creates a commit-
ment to comity. Each party should consider the other's interests and
not apply its own competition laws when they are inconsistent with the
superior interests of the other party.
Despite its intentions, this requirement of comity is not effective at
eliminating conflicts in the area of mergers for two reasons. The most
obvious reason is that comity creates no legal obligation. As the
Supreme Court has noted, comity is "neither a matter of absolute
obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon
the other.' 1 67 The parties need only consider the other's interest, but
there is no concrete requirement for conduct. Second, even if the
interests of the other party were truly taken into account, it would be a
rare case when either the European Community or the United States
considered the other's interest more important than its own. In the
Boeing example, it is fair to say that both parties would consider their
respective interests in Boeing and Airbus to be very substantial. Any
deferral to the other party is unlikely.
Even assuming that this treaty was effective and that the parties
regularly deferred to the other party's interests, this deferral may not
be good for the market in the case of mergers. If, for example, the
European Community deferred to the United States in the Boeing case
because Boeing and McDonnell Douglas are U.S. companies, this
could have drastic effects on competition. The United States will have
an incentive to pass the merger even if it is anticompetitive. Without
the European Community to balance those interests, the aerospace
industry could become a monopoly. By deferring to a "superior" U.S.
interest, the default position would change from one of over-
164. See id. art. 5.
165. See id. art. 4.
166. Id. art. 6.
167. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895).
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competition to one of possible monopoly power abuses. Most econo-
mists would agree that if enforcement must break down, it is better to
have too much competition than not enough. Thus, the treaty is, at
best, ineffective, and, at worst, anticompetitive in the area of mergers
and acquisitions.
V. CONCLUSION
Because of the danger of anticompetitive mergers, extraterritorial
application of competition laws is necessary under the current system.
Extraterritorial application of EC and U.S. laws prevents anticompeti-
tive mergers from occurring, thereby protecting competition. Unfortu-
nately, industrial interests dictate that some mergers, which are not
inconsistent with the market, are blocked. While this default position of
competition is generally better than no extraterritorial application at
all, the European Community and United States could do better.
Although eliminating national welfare incentives from the Commis-
sion, FTC, and DOJ would be nearly impossible, there could be a way to
limit industrial welfare concerns from the area of merger regulation.
One solution would be to create ajoint enforcement body. An indepen-
dent board comprised of representatives of both jurisdictions would be
able to eliminate national policy considerations and replace them with
true competition policy. By eliminating these incentives, each merger
could be judged on its efficiency gains and losses on a global scale. This
would ensure that efficiency gains are not lost and anticompetitive
mergers are not approved because of industrial policy.
An effective enforcement board could be modeled after the current
Competition Commission in the European Community. Directorate IV
has managed to apply competition policy consistently to the fifteen
member states, without one state's interests being disproportionately
taken into account. The same thing could be done by creating a board
with equal numbers of members from the United States and the
European Community. Of course, the board should be as politically
independent as possible; any inadvertent political considerations would
be balanced by membership on both sides.
This board could then determine which mergers to consider by
employing the effects test, which is accepted by both the European
Community and the United States. The board would exercise jurisdic-
tion over any merger that had substantial effects in the European
Community and the United States. Once the board tookjurisdiction no
other authority could consider the merger. The board would apply the
same substantive approach that is now taken by EC and U.S. enforce-
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ment authorities, considering market share, demand side substitution,
and barriers to entry. It could then balance efficiency gains and losses
to determine whether an otherwise anticompetitive merger is neverthe-
less desirable.
Regulation by the board would be essentially the same as that
currently applied by the United States and the European Community,
with one important exception. The enforcement board would apply
competition policy alone, without any influence from national indus-
trial policy and welfare concerns. Examining the merger from a purely
competitive standpoint, the board would neither advance an anticom-
petitive merger to promote a domestic industry, nor oppose an effi-
ciency enhancing merger to protect the industry. The novel approach
would always measure the merger against its effects on the market.
Efficiency-producing mergers would be advanced, while anticompeti-
tive and allocatively inefficient mergers would be opposed. Eventually,
this model could be expanded to structure a global board on mergers
and acquisitions. Until that time, joint enforcement by the two most
powerful economies in the world would be a good start toward total
global harmonization of competition laws.
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